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Studying the neural basis of decision-making has largely
taken one of two paths: one has involved cell-by-cell char-
acterization of neuronal circuits in invertebrates; and the
other, single-unit studies ofmonkeys performing cognitive
tasks. Here I shall attempt to bring these two disparate
approaches together.
We tend to think about choices and decisions as momen-
tous, life-changing events: whether to take a job, to get mar-
ried, to buy a house. We also consider choices and decisions
to be cognitive processes: we rationally enumerate the
options, weigh them against our likes and dislikes, hold up
the choices against our moral values, and imagine the conse-
quences of the choices based on our previous experience
and knowledge. Undoubtedly, some of our choices are
accomplished this way, but we make many more choices
without much rational thought: we decide to walk, but do
not think about whether to take the first step with our right
or left foot; we walk over to the cafeteria for lunch with little
thought about the intricacies of the path we take; we may
even make moral choices unconsciously and have difficulty
reasoning why we make them [1]. Likewise, some animals
with very little cognition (for example, slugs, crabs, even
leeches) constantly make choices about how to handle ex-
ternal stimuli and internal drives (such as hunger, reproduc-
tion, circadian rhythms): they decide which stimuli to ignore,
how to respond to another animal (for example, chase it off,
escape from it, feed on it, mate with it), whether to act
directly or indirectly, whether to respond immediately or to
wait awhile. Many of the choices that animals make are
species-specific (a dog and a cat respond very differently
to a verbal command), whereas others are idiosyncratic
(we would be surprised if Dick Cheney chose to emulate
Mahatma Ghandi, for instance, or if Snoop Dogg decided
to make a CD of Gregorian chant).
Research on how brains make decisions has been driven
by two major traditions: psychological/cognitive and neuro-
ethological/behavioral. Those working in the psychological/
cognitive tradition typically study humans or animals doing
behaviors that are human-like. Cortical recordings from
single units in awake, behaving monkeys is the favored ap-
proach, while the monkeys perform such tasks as making
sensory discriminations [2,3], judging the value of a stimulus
[4] or the probability of its success [5], or playing interactive
strategy games that depend on the behavior of another
agent, either protoplasmic or siliconic [6]. In these studies,
neurons become candidate decision-makers on the basis
of three kinds of properties: first, their firing patterns are
more correlated with the decision made than with either
the stimulus or the motor output; second, the timing of their
changes in activity closely match the timing of the behavior
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the cortex centered on that neuron can bias the decisions
that the monkey makes [8]. These studies have the distinct
advantage of being close to what springs to mind when we
‘make a decision’ [9], but they have the disadvantage of
being embedded in complex brains, precluding a detailed
study of the neuronal circuitry and cellular properties under-
lying the behavior.
Because a major motivation for the neuroethological/be-
havioral approach is to find underlying neuronal circuits re-
sponsible for the behaviors, neuroethologists select animals
and behaviors for their simplicity, accessibility, and robust-
ness. Such studies start with more natural behaviors and
tend to consider choices between qualitatively different
behaviors (such as swimming versus crawling, or feeding
versus egg-laying) or between different forms of the same
behavior (such as ingesting food versus rejecting it, or swim-
ming versus scratching). The strength of this approach is that
it can answer specific questions clearly and convincingly. A
weakness is that the mechanisms found for decision-making
in a leech might not be the same as those found in a sea slug,
much less in a mammal like us. I will argue, however, that
building an interface between psychology/cognition and
neuroethology/behavior will help to find the neuronal
circuitry and cellular mechanisms responsible for decision-
making in all animals.
It is important to remember that many profound insights
are being generated using techniques, such as functional
imaging or electroencephalography, that are never likely to
achieve neuronal resolution. Furthermore, deep insights
have come from considering individual neurons and parts
of the brain as information conveyors, with little attempt to
fathom the circuitry underlying the coding and decoding of
information [10,11]. The remaining discussion will assume
the point of view, without further consideration, that knowing
the detailed neuron-by-neuron circuitry underlying decision-
making is beneficial and would make even the lower resolu-
tion or information coding studies more interpretable. To
discuss the circuitry underlying decision-making requires
a short consideration of two general types of neuronal mech-
anism that have been proposed for making decisions.
Neurons and Behavioral Choices
Historically, the first approach for understanding how brains
cause behavior was to consider that all behaviors, however
complex, are composed of reflexes: sensory input automat-
ically produces a motor output [6]. The particular response
produced can be influenced by many complicating factors —
for example, inherent biases, internal states, age, experi-
ence, the presence of other stimuli — but the standard
approach is to define the minimal stimulus-response kernel,
then add on the various embellishments one at a time. In this
approach, decisions are made by specific neurons at the
transition between sensory and motor processing: highly
processed sensory activity provides input to the decision
makers, activity of which triggers a particular behavior (Fig-
ure 1A). Typically, decision makers do not themselves con-
nect to motor neurons but instead activate a ‘pattern-gener-
ator’, a neuronal circuit that produces a spatiotemporal
activity pattern, which in turn drives constellations of motor
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Figure 1. Two different possibilities for the
way that neuronal circuits decide between
alternative behaviors.
(A) A reflexive possibility. Two different be-
haviors are triggered by different sets of sen-
sory neurons, although the sensory neurons
activated may overlap extensively in location
and timing. The sensory input is then pro-
cessed, often in complex ways, presenting
highly abstracted input to the decision
makers. Once activated, these decision
makers turn on the pattern generator for be-
havior A and turn off the pattern generators
for other behaviors; in this case, mutual inhibi-
tion between the decision makers is indi-
cated, although the inhibition could be at
any of the levels. Adapted from [12]. (B) A dy-
namical possibility. The graph represents the
activity of three decision making neurons or
groups of neurons, x, y, and z. (Such an anal-
ysis could be done for any number of neurons
or neuron types, but it would require an addi-
tional axis for each one.) Stimuli A and B affect
the activity of all three neurons/types, which
initiates two different behaviors by triggering
two different activity patterns in the three
cells/clusters. The ovals represent locations
in the activity space that are stable (when the activity enters either region, is sustains itself within that region). The regions between the ovals
are unstable, so that activity tends to move toward one of the stable regions (they are ‘attractors’), or falls back to rest.neurons to produce a useful, coordinated behavior [12]. In its
most extreme formulation, this approach posits that deci-
sion makers are both necessary and sufficient for selecting
a behavior: stimulating them produces the behavior and ab-
lating them eliminates at least one of the behavioral options.
In this extreme view, the only time that a decision maker is
ever active is during the time when its particular behavior is
selected. In this scheme, understanding decision making
means identifying the decision makers and determining their
inputs.
In the neuroethological tradition, ‘decision neurons’ were
originally called ‘command neurons’, because stimulating
a single one of them reliably commanded a complex behav-
ioral pattern [13]. Later, Kupfermann and Weiss [14] argued
that real behaviors are likely to result from the activation
of neuronal populations, which they termed ‘command sys-
tems’. The notion that command neurons are, in fact, the de-
cision makers was an assumption, a hypothesis that required
testing. It also seemed reasonable that the decision to pro-
duce one behavior rather than another one would be a win-
ner-take-all contest among command neurons, with the
winner inhibiting all the losers [15]. There was some early
suggestive evidence that this was accurate: intracellular
recordings from ‘loser’ command neurons received strong
inhibition when a winning behavior was elicited [16].
A qualitatively different approach to decision making,
one favored by neural net theorists, is a dynamical one,
illustrated in Figure 1B, in which the same decision-making
neurons are active during several distinct behaviors but their
activity patterns are different in each behavior [17]. These
different patterns are often called ‘attractor states’ because
they are stable — they can persist for long periods —
whereas similar activity patterns are unstable and become
(‘fall into’) one of the attractor states. The behavior produced
by an attractor might be maintained (as in, standing, sitting,
lying down) or cyclic (as in walking, swimming, chewing), al-
though cyclic ones have received more attention. An impor-
tant distinction between attractor and reflexive mechanismsis that, because all the attractors are composed of the same
neurons, there is no inhibitory interaction among separate
populations of decision makers in the different attractor
states.
Is there a single mechanism of decision-making in known
neuronal circuits? The clear answer is no. Even when there
is evidence for inhibition among behavioral circuits, the site
and source of the inhibition are not the same in different sys-
tems. I will give some examples that are discussed more fully
in a recent book chapter [12].
Reflexive versus Dynamical Decision-Making
in Neuronal Circuits
Inhibition between Behavioral Circuits
In the European medicinal leech, Hirudo, feeding sup-
presses all responses to tactile stimuli [18]. When these
leeches begin to feed, the only change in the tactile sensory
pathways is presynaptic inhibition of the terminals made by
the sensory neurons onto all of its central targets [19]. So,
just as in mammalian pain sensation [20], the choice to not
respond to mechanosensory input is made by gating out
sensory input at the first synaptic site in the reflex pathway.
A more complicated variation on this theme is that swim-
ming inhibits feeding in the sea slug Pleurobranchaea [21].
The feeding pattern generator includes one group of neu-
rons (I2) that excite a second group (I1 neurons), which in
turn feed back to inhibit the I2 neurons along with many
other neurons; this feedback helps to produce the rhythmic
feeding motor pattern (Figure 2A). During swimming, partic-
ular neurons (A-ci1 and others, as yet unidentified) are ex-
cited by all the swim pattern-generating neurons, so that
they are continuously active throughout the swimming
bout. The A-ci1 neurons strongly excite I1 neurons, which
feed strong and steady inhibition onto all the feeding-gener-
ating neurons, breaking the rhythmic feeding motor pattern
and turning it off. In this case, swimming inhibits feeding by
interactions at the level of pattern-generating neurons, rather
than at the level of sensory input as in the leech or among
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R930decision-makers, a suggested mechanism by which feeding
in a sea slug diminishes its withdrawal response to touch [16].
Evidence for Dynamics: Multifunctional
Decision Neurons
Touching a leech at its front end reliably elicits a shortening
response, even if the animal is in the midst of swimming [22].
In line with the ‘inhibition-among-decision-neurons’ hypoth-
esis, this tactile stimulus strongly inhibits one of the most
powerful swim command neurons (cell 204). When three
other command neurons (cells Tr1, SE1, and 61) were tested
in exactly the same way, however, they were found to be ex-
cited during shortening. This means that 75% of the neurons
that command swimming when stimulated individually are
excited by stimuli that elicit shortening, a behavior incom-
patible with swimming. This finding suggests that individual
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Figure 2. Neural networks that produce deci-
sions in monkeys and sea slugs.
(A) The circuitry underlying the interactions
among swimming, feeding, and turning in
the sea slug, Pleurobranchaea. Circles repre-
sent individually identified neurons or small
clusters of neurons. Open triangles are excit-
atory synaptic connections and blackened
circles are inhibitory connections. Lines end-
ing in both symbols indicate a connection
that is mixed inhibitory and excitatory. Adap-
ted from [12]. (B) A network that summarizes
the kinds of decisions made by monkeys in
selecting among two or more sensory stimuli.
The smaller boxes represent the kinds of fea-
tures and information processing that take
place in the outside world (to the left of the
dashed line) and in the monkey’s brain (to
the right of the line). In the original diagram,
there were equations in many of the boxes
representing the kinds of processing that are
performed in the brain. The large grey box en-
closes the core decision-making elements.
The other boxes modify the function of the de-
cision making core (inside the large grey box).
Adapted from [3].
decision-makers are not dedicated to
a single behavior, but instead are ac-
tive during several behaviors — they
are multifunctional. Similarly, the pat-
tern generators for turning while crawl-
ing and for swimming in the sea slug
are composed of the same neurons,
operating in different modes [23]. At
low levels of tactile stimulation, the
slug crawls in a direction dictated by
the relative levels of activity in four se-
rotonergic command neurons (As1-4);
as the tactile sensory input is in-
creased, the system becomes oscilla-
tory and produces a swim-like escape
response (Figure 2A).
Evidence for Dynamics: Covariation
Is the Key
Appropriately placed tactile stimulation
of a leech produces either swimming or
crawling with nearly equal probability
[24]. Using voltage-sensitive dyes to monitor the activity of
many individual neurons at once, only a few neurons were
found to have membrane potential trajectories that were dif-
ferent before swimming from their trajectories before crawl-
ing. Because these neurons had different activity patterns
before either behavioral motor pattern was expressed, they
were good candidates for being decision-makers. Stimulat-
ing these neurons individually, however, did not influence
whether swimming or crawling occurred. Looking more
deeply into the activity patterns, the co-varying activity of a
small set of neurons discriminated between swimming and
crawling at an even earlier time (an average of 290 millisec-
onds earlier) than did any of the individually discriminating
neurons. Depolarizing or hyperpolarizing one of these
‘group-discriminating’ neurons (cell 208) significantly biased
the behavior toward crawling or swimming. Surprisingly, the
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criminators were a separate population from the individual
discriminators. This implies that the ‘individual discrimina-
tors’ did not help to make the decision, but rather carried
out the decision that was made nearly 300 milliseconds ear-
lier by the co-varying group discriminators. In fact, the previ-
ously identified command neurons for swimming were
among the individual discriminators, implying that their role
is to activate a motor program rather than to decide which
behavior to choose.
A similar conclusion about the function of command neu-
rons came from a study of the role of two identified command
neurons in initiating feeding in the pond snail Lymnaea [25].
Because neither command neuron was active earlier than
one of the central pattern-generating interneurons, their
functional role appears to be to set the frequency of the feed-
ing rhythm and to determine the burst durations of motor
neurons. This study concluded that the decision to start
feeding was most likely made by distributed excitation
among the CPG neurons rather than by specialized com-
mand neurons.
The Future: Possible Cross-Influences
Because the two traditions — the psychological/cognitive
and the neuroethological/behavioral — are interested in dif-
ferent aspects of decision-making, is there any reason for
them to interact? Are there lessons to be learned in bringing
together the two approaches? I believe that the nervous sys-
tems of all complex animals — those with 302 or more neu-
rons [26] — have common mechanisms for dealing with the
outer and inner worlds. The facts that action potentials
were first explained in squid [27,28], synaptic potentials in
frogs [29], lateral inhibition in horseshoe crabs [30], and
mechanisms of synaptic plasticity in the sea hare, Aplysia
[31], bring home the power of the comparative approach:
using whatever animal is best suited to answer a particular
question [32]. So, how can research on behavioral choice
in invertebrates inform research on vertebrate decision-
making?
For all the elegance of correlating neuronal firing patterns
with behavioral choices in monkeys, and the ability to influ-
ence those choices by stimulating localized regions of the
brain, the models that emerge from such studies (Figure 2B)
are formal, with boxes that represent firing rates and psycho-
physical capabilities [3,6]. A major thrust of this work is to
describe the relationships among the boxes, ideally by rigor-
ously fitting data with equations developed from psycho-
physics. Invertebrate studies, on the other hand, yield
specific circuit diagrams and biophysical models that ex-
plain how the behavioral choices could be made [12]; in
Figure 2A, the circles and lines represent individually identi-
fied neurons and the connections among them. Furthermore,
such circuit diagrams suggest how circuit modules can be
used to produce different behaviors and how to test whether
the circuits use neuromodulation or changes in dynamics to
switch from one behavior to another [17]. Hence invertebrate
studies can, in principle, add biophysical reality to the formal
arrows and boxes generated by monkey studies.
How about the other direction: how can the mammalian
studies influence the invertebrate studies? A major contribu-
tion of the psychophysical approach used to study monkey
decision-making is the hard-headed quantification of the ex-
perimental data and the parsing of the different elements of
decision-making, such as sensory discrimination, built-inbiases, experience (also called ‘priors’), and values [3,6,9].
Despite a tradition of using behavioral data to test quantita-
tive models in ethology [33], neuroethological studies of
decision making tend to be relatively qualitative and
model-light. For the invertebrate studies to inform monkey
work, invertebrate systems must be tested on psychophys-
ical tasks comparable to those used for monkeys, There
have been some steps in this direction, such as studying
the cost-benefit calculations made by slugs in selecting
from their behavioral repertoire [34] and how food value af-
fects foraging choices in locusts [35]. The cellular mecha-
nisms of these behavioral capabilities are much more likely
to be found in invertebrate preparations, but they will be of
only marginal interest to monkey experimenters unless the
level of psychophysical detail is similar and the behavioral
capabilities prove to be at least qualitatively the same. This
would open the mammalian experiments to the richness of
circuitry and modulation known for invertebrate nervous
systems [12,17,36]. This kind of synergy would add consid-
erable strength to the study of behavioral choice.
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